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1. INTRODUCTION1
What are the sources of the revenues of the Hungarian general government and 
what expenditures are financed from taxpayers’ money? To what extent does the 
structure of revenues and expenditure differ from the structure of mature market 
economies? These are some of the questions the authors address by presenting and 
interpreting aggregated data. 
The optimal structure of general government accounts is partly a question of 
efficiency and partly a question of goals and values. While efficiency and values may 
sometimes be in conflict, optimisation is more likely to be hindered by the inconclusive 
predictions of economic theory and empirical analysis concerning the economic and 
social impact of public revenues and expenditure. Therefore instead of a specific 
theoretical model, the framework for our analysis will be the considerations and 
suggestions offered in current academic discussions, and by the policy statements of 
the Hungarian government. 
Hungarian macroeconomists largely agree on the necessity of a reform of the 
general government.   The presentations at a recent conference2 indicate that there is a 
general consensus on some key goals and the nature of the reforms. It seems to be 
widely accepted that the budget should be balanced, and should enable investment-
based economic growth. Few experts question the necessity of reducing income 
redistribution (defined as revenues as percentage of GDP). The arguments for reforms 
tend to be based on efficiency rather than on social justice or redistribution (Csillag 
2001a). Specific proposals vary widely. Some propose a substantial reduction of tax 
revenues to a level of 30-35 % characterising the Baltic states (e.g. Csillag 1b and Békesi 
2001). Others call for a clarification of the functions of the state (e.g. Pete, 2001) and are 
assessment of the genuine cost of maintaining these functions  (as opposed to across-
the-board cuts in the budget), the reduction of high tax and contribution levels to 
improve the tax compliance (see László 2001), a reduction of taxes on capital gains in 
order to promote growth (Valentinyi 2002), and the strengthening of local governments 
through developing local institutions and expertise (Kopányi, 2001).  
There is no legislation to prescribe the structure of the general government in 
Hungary. The General Government Act serves primarily to ensure transparency and 
fiscal discipline, and thus contains only general provisions on the goals and functions 
of the general government. 
The government programme for the period between 2002 and 2006 outlines the 
creation of a small and economical government through the implementation of reforms 
which will also improve the quality of public services. The programme sets out the 
reduction of taxation and redistribution in order to strengthen the income generating 
capacity of the economy, along with the stimulation of domestic savings and the influx 
of foreign investment to ensure financing for a high growth path. The programme also 
includes a reduction of the scope of government intervention and a strengthening of 
the local and regional levels by the decentralisation of financial resources. In the field of 
productive expenditure (primarily targeting infrastructure and human capital 
                                          
1 The authors are grateful for the comments received in the internal discussions of the study. 
2 The conference was organised by Pénzügykutató Részvénytársaság in April 2001.; The October 2001 
issue of the Economic Review (Közgazdasági szemle) published a selection of presentations from the 
conference. 
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investments) the government programme suggests an increasing role to be played by 
the state. 
The aims of the 2004 Convergence Programme, which sets out Hungary’s EU 
integration strategy, include a gradual and steady reduction of the size of the general 
government in order to improve the external equilibrium and the competitiveness of 
the economy. According to the programme, tax revenues will be reduced to 37 % of the 
GDP by 2008, the ratio of redistribution (as a percentage of GDP) will be at about 43-44 
%, while the level of redistribution (as a percentage of GDP) will decline to 48 % by 
2008 from the 48.8 % projected for 2004.3 On the revenue side, envisaged measures 
target the improvement of economic competitiveness (stimulation of savings and 
investment), the reduction of taxes levied on the household sector, and the 
harmonisation of regulations entailed by Hungary’s EU membership. On the 
expenditure side the key objective is to render the system more economical and more 
efficient, which will entail a cutting of expenditure in real terms, with the exception of 
some priority areas4. In accordance with the government programme, the convergence 
programme also prescribes that spending needs to be reduced through reforms which 
will at the same time guarantee improvements in the quality of public services. 
Some of the above mentioned recommendations and policy documents outline 
goals that are easy to measure; in the following the current state of the general 
government will, wherever possible, be presented in relation to such goals. The general 
objective of this paper is to assess the fundamental structure of the expenditure and 
revenue side and, as such, it relies on aggregate data and its conclusions are based on 
an international and time series comparison of the Hungarian data. The authors aim to 
present the data in a systematic way in order to provide evidence and a broad 
overview for future discussions on the possible transformation of the general 
government. 
It should be noted that our analysis is based on macro level data, so it will reveal 
little about the equity of redistribution or the incentive effects of taxes and benefits. 
These would require individual level analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
In our analysis of efficiency and redistribution we define welfare in a somewhat narrow 
sense as the production and consumption of goods and services, rather than in terms of 
the quality of life or opportunities in life. . A more comprehensive analysis would have 
required richer data sets enabling international comparison as well, and it would have 
taken substantially longer. Finally, we do not aim to analyse the issues of state debt and 
deficit and their impact on the financial markets as such, although we acknowledge 
these are closely related to the budget. These issues will be examined only to the extent 
to that they influence the structure of expenditure. 
The remaining sections of the Introduction will provide a brief overview of the 
impacts of the general government as they appear in economic theories, on the 
regulation of the European Union concerning fiscal policy and on the databases used. 
The second chapter of the paper describes the size of the general government in a 
European comparison, while the third and the fourth chapter is devoted to the 
structure of revenues and expenditure, respectively. The Conclusion summarises the 
                                          
3 Without EU transfers centralisation is 41.2% and redistribution is 43.9% according to the proportions 
estimated for 2008. (Hungary Convergence Programme 2004.) 
4 These include value adjustments of pensions and social benefits, defence expenses related to NSTO 
membership, motorway construction and construction of the No.4. metro line. 
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areas where restructuring of revenues or expenditure may bring efficiency gains, and 
finally, it outlines directions for further, more detailed research.  
1.1.Economic effects of the general government - a theoretical approach  
The general government is the framework of the financing of the tasks 
undertaken by the state, therefore, its desirable structure may be derived from the set of 
tasks the state should undertake and from the amounts that should be spent on each. 
The traditional answer of welfare economics is that the state should play a role where 
the market fails to do so.5 This may be supplemented by the task of making the 
distribution of incomes more equitable. No precise task list has, however, been drawn 
so far from the areas where the market fails, i.e. there is no theoretical framework for 
the provision of a definition of an ideal general government. Another (theoretical as 
well as empirical) question is whether the state is really capable of remedying failures 
of the market and whether such activities of the state are not actually more costly than 
the value of the loss that is hoped to be avoided in this way.6 Finally, no answer has 
been given to the question as to what means the state should apply to most optimally 
carry out the tasks so undertaken: for instance, what should be addressed by regulation 
and what should be financed by the state (for more information on this, see Hills, 2004). 
A theoretical approach is, nonetheless, not entirely useless, for a well-founded review 
of general government expenditure may enable the saving of substantial amounts 
though the cutting of items that do not have positive impacts on redistribution or 
welfare (see for instance, Pete 1995). 
Accordingly, the performance of the state of economic roles - besides its political 
tasks and those relating to the protection of rule and order - is justified by tasks that 
improve the welfare of the society but that would - for some reason - not or not 
properly operate on a commercial basis.7 Such state intervention may improve current 
welfare or enhance the resources for future welfare. This is treated in a special way by 
empirical literature, where the relationship between the various types of expenditure 
and economic growth are explored.  
Expenditures may, however, have inadvertent negative impacts as well, such as 
through the crowding-out effect of state investments reducing private investment, or 
                                          
5 A market failure may occur if one of the basic requirements of effective operation of the market is not 
satisfied. These are the following requirements: (i) the market players are fully informed of the quality 
and price of the products as well as the future, (ii) the actors have a similar economic weight in the 
market (no monopolies), consider prices as external features and finally (iii) there are no external 
economic impacts, public goods, or increasing returns to scale. For more information see e.g., Csaba-
Tóth (1999). 
6 Pete (2001) discusses in detail cases of government failures and the theoretical basis of the general 
government reform in his presentation prepared for the above conference. We cannot review the 
literature more extensively here, but a good starting point would be Csaba-Tóth (1999), Cullis és Jones 
2003, and references in articles published in the 2001 October issue of Közgazdasági szemle (Economic 
Review). 
7 Footnote No.4. describes cases of market failure. An example: a motorway could be a positive external 
factor if many market actors of a given region will benefit from its construction, but the costs of 
construction cannot be collected from them, because it is difficult to measure the yield of the new road, 
and it is difficult to arrange that the road should only be used by those who have contributed to its 
construction. Negative external factors (when the activities of a market actor involve harmful side 
effects for the society too, but the market does not make him pay for them), e.g., an environmental tax 
may similarly improve the allocation of resources. 
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through the reduction of labour by the provision of welfare benefits. Similar negative 
stimulation or distortion impacts may also be observed in the case of revenues, as a result 
of the fact that operations and transactions subject to tax or contribution payments will 
reduce the returns of the participants of the market in comparison to their real 
economic benefits as a consequence of which decisions on investment and the labour 
supply do not necessarily develop in a way as will ensure the highest possible 
economic performance. 
Finally, the redistributive effect of the general government will also appear on the 
side of revenues as well as that of expenditures. Through the collection of taxes and 
contributions the state draws income from individuals and other participants of the 
economy and if the degree of this income collection is not even, some may spend 
relatively less and others may spend relatively more income than what would follow 
from their economic performance. A significant proportion of the state revenues 
however is directly returned to the population in the form of welfare benefits, services 
and entitlements. The share of individuals usually differs from what should follow 
from the taxes they pay. This is the redistributive effect of the expenditure side. 
Economic effect of taxes and contributions  
Taxes and contributions are the key revenues both in respect of the impact of the 
general government on the economy as well as in respect of their magnitude. The 
economic impact of the various tax types and consequently their redistribution and 
distortion effects as outlined above, may also vary. 
In the case of indirect taxes (e.g. VAT, income taxes and taxes levied on 
consumption in general) the burden is not borne in economic sense by the taxpayer 
(that is, the taxpayer in legal/regulatory sense). In this case the tax is passed on by the 
participant of the economy actually paying the tax, to its buyers, in its prices. Direct 
taxes (e.g. income tax, local taxes in general) are borne by the same persons both in 
legal and economic terms. The social security contributions payable on a mandatory 
basis, ensuring the financing of ill health, unemployment, retirement or other such risks 
and events are paid by the employer or the employee. 
The indirect tax is relatively neutral from the aspect of decisions made on savings 
and investment, making no difference between imports and local production (which is 
of particular importance in the case of the European Union) and treats income from 
work, capital and transfers equally, therefore, it has no negative stimulus on decisions 
relating to investments or the labour market.8 Since this type of tax is easier to collect, 
the weight of taxes originating from indirect taxes is relatively higher in countries 
where taxpayer discipline is weaker. 
One advantage of direct taxes is that they enable equality easier along with the 
principle of equal treatment than indirect taxes. Furthermore, they also enable the state 
to provide targeted income support to certain groups. One of the disadvantages of such 
taxes is, however, that they may have a contrary stimulus concerning decisions 
pertaining the delaying of consumption, that is the stimulus of savings. 
                                          
8 The consumption tax does not distort, if it is uniform, or it varies according to the different price 
flexibility of products. The uniform consumption tax imposes a greater burden on people with a lower 
income, because the share of assets with low income flexibility is higher in their consumption and 
because savings (not burdened with taxes) represent a smaller proportion of their income. However, 
these unfavourable redistribution impacts may be compensated more effectively with subsidies, as they 
can be targeted more accurately. 
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The direct taxes and social security contributions payable on wages will increase the 
costs of labour whereby they have a contrary stimulus on the demand for labour. The 
taxes and contributions payable on labour income may reduce the supply of labour as 
well. One argument for their reduction may be that this may enable the alleviation of 
unemployment trap situations: high tax and contribution rates will reduce the stimulus 
of the unemployed to take up employment if the net wage received is not higher than 
the social benefits to which they are entitled as unemployed. 
Economic impact of government spending  
If financed from credit, the magnitude of expenditure on its own has an impact on 
the economy. Through increasing the rates of interests this leads to the crowding out of 
private investment. The structure of expenditure is also highly important: public 
investment projects may stimulate growth directly. Welfare benefits - besides 
supported by strong arguments of equitability - may promote or hinder economic 
effectiveness, for most of them relate to some problem of insurance which the market 
alone cannot resolve but where the governmental solution is not perfect either. The 
recipients of the benefits do not only include those in need and benefits accessible 
under easy conditions may lead to a reduction of the labour supply. Finally, the 
benefits that do enhance the effectiveness of capital or labour may lead to an increase of 
the growth rate in a longer run. This latter category includes infrastructure projects, 
education and health.  
A positive impact on growth however, does not only depend on the larger 
weight of various categories of expenditure, but also on the quality of expenditure, i.e., 
on the extent to which they are capable of eliminating certain imperfections of the 
market, or of exploiting positive external effects. Moreover, even if the effect achieved 
is positive, it may not necessarily be substantial. Valentinyi (2002) for instance assessed 
the effects of the public spending in an endogenous growth model (in a general 
equilibrium framework) and found that the impacts of taxes on capital gains are the 
strongest while other taxes and the productive expenditure of the government have 
much smaller effects on the economy. The conclusion is that the reduction of taxes on 
capital gains - assuming that this is offset by a cut in non-productive expenditure or an 
increase in other taxes so that the budget remains balanced - is a more reliable way to 
promote growth and convergence than is the increasing of productive expenditure. 
The impacts of expenditure on long term economic growth are summed up in 
the following table.  
Table 1: The impacts of expenditure on long term economic growth  
The nature of the 
impact The impact on growth  Examples 
productive (+) increasing of the marginal productivity of capital or labour  
infrastructure development 
projects, education, research 
and development, health  
non-productive (-) reduction / no increase of marginal productivity  
economic services, 
entertainment expenditure  
Source: European Communities (2004): based on 169. 
Authors of pieces of empirical technical literature more or less agree that there is 
a positive relationship between long term growth and public infrastructure investment 
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projects, education and research and development (European Communities, 2004). The 
degree of this impact is, however, highly disputed and if other factors that have an 
impact on growth are also taken into account in the empirical model, the positive 
impact is not always significant. A brief overview is provided on the relevant technical 
literature by Valentinyi (2002): according to the somewhat sceptical conclusion the 
results usually turn out to be moderate. The assessment of Hungarian data is 
particularly difficult owing partly to the brevity of the time series and partly to the high 
degree of openness of the economy. For the impacts of the fiscal policy may only be 
identified by eliminating the impacts of the external demand. This problem is referred 
to in a recent study which identified a weak positive relationship between productive 
expenditure and growth.9
1.2. EU principles and trends affecting the general government  
Coordination of taxation principles and systems in the European Union  
Taxation policy falls within the competency of national governments, and its aim 
is to enable the financing of public spending and redistribution. Within the monetary 
union, taxation also serves to ensure stabilisation, and the balancing of shocks in order 
to enable the sustainability of the common monetary policy. Accordingly, instead of the 
standardisation of the national taxation systems the objective of the European Union is 
to ensure only the compatibility of the systems of the Member States with each other 
and with the objectives of the EU, with a special regard to the free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital (the principle of four freedoms) and to competition in the 
market.  
The EU regulation prohibits the application of any taxes that would provide 
direct or indirect advantage to domestic production against the rest of the Member 
States. The regulation of VAT and the income tax (the most important indirect taxes) is 
harmonised within the European Union for these play a special role on the freedom of 
the movement of goods and services. The coordination of direct taxes is not as 
important as that of the indirect taxes, indeed, numerous direct tax regulations are 
assigned entirely to the national scope of competency. 
The regulation of social security contributions is not coordinated at all, indeed, there 
are no such intents, for such contributions are not regarded as parts of the entirety of 
the taxation system. In this respect the European Union only prescribes that employees 
and self-employers should not pay double social security contributions. 
In accordance with the objectives of the Lisbon process the European Union pays 
particular attention to the following two areas: (i) the stimulation impacts of the 
taxation system, i.e. the possibility of increasing participation in the labour market, and 
(ii) the role played by the taxation system in the improvement of competitiveness. 
Accordingly, the objectives established in general in respect of the transformation of the 
taxation systems of the Member States include (i) reduction of the rates of the taxes on 
income from labour, (ii) cutting of taxes on corporate incomes and (iii) improvement of 
the operation of capital markets, though the implementation of reforms varies in terms 
of depth and intensity. During the 1990’s the key endeavour was focused on the 
reduction of the tax burdens in terms of GDP, primarily through the cutting of the 
                                          
9 Budapest Economics (2004). According to the study expenditure relating to order, public security, 
legislation and implementation, education, health, environmental protection, housing support and the 
public road network is productive expenditure. 
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personal income tax rates and the social security contributions, and to a lesser extent 
through the reduction of corporate income tax rates. 
The EU guideline concerning the general government expenditure  
The EU has no generally applicable regulations concerning the expenditure side 
of the general government. According to the Maastricht criteria of the Stability and 
Growth Pact the budget deficit of a Member State intending to join or one that has 
joined the Monetary Union may not exceed 3 % of GDP and the government debt may 
not exceed 60 % of GDP. 
Besides a thrifty and disciplined budget policy the quality of expenditure is also 
growing increasingly important. This means primarily that in addition to the 
magnitude of expenditure attention is also to be paid to whether the composition of 
expenditure ensures the stability of the economy, the accomplishment of the strategic 
goals and the effective and efficient utilisation of resources. Decisions on public 
spending are made by the national governments but the majority of the strategic goals 
and the ensuring of stability is part of the strategy established at the level of the 
European Union, therefore, there is a case for the Community for monitoring the 
structure of the general government expenditure of the Member States. 
The European Commission is working on the development of a set of indicators 
and ratios10  which will reveal the social and economic impacts of general government 
expenditure, by simple means. In the first step they have developed a complex 
indicator to show the effects of expenditure on long term growth evaluating the 
magnitudes of the various types of expenditure as percentages of GDP according to the 
existing aggregated national statistics. The structure of the indicator is presented in 
Annex 2. 
Table 2: The structure of the long term growth indicator  
 The content and reasons for the category Evaluation (score) 
  min. Level of expenditure  
  max low  average high 
1.  Interest payments [-2,0] - - - 
2. pensions, public consumption, wages in the public sector;
these items may have a negative impact over a specific 
level on employment, savings and investments. 
[-1,1] + + - 
3.  benefits provided for those in a disadvantaged position, 
housing subsidies, family allowance, unemployment 
benefit; too low level of expenditure may entail growth of
income inequalities and a too high level will hinder 
growth on account of the moral risk and the potential 
development of reliance on benefits. 
[-1,1] - + - 
4. education, health, research and development, investment
(environment protection is not yet included); physical 
and human capital investments, as well as technological 
development always promote growth. 
[0,2] + + + 
                                          
10 See European Communities (2002): 97-109, and European Communities (2003): 56.  
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Source: European Communities (2002): 97-109. Comment: the indicator assigns a single 
score to each category depending on the size of the given item of expenditure in the 
given group in comparison to the EU average. This is followed by the aggregation of 
the scores (assigning equal weights to each). The first four columns show the interval in 
which the given expenditure item is granted scores: for instance the expenditures in 
category 3 increase the indicator by one point if their value equals the EU average, then 
as they grow farther from the average they are worth less and less and in an extreme 
case they may even reduce the value of the composite indicator. 
According to the indicator calculated from year 2002 data on Hungary and the 
1999 EU data11 the quality of the Hungarian budget was between that of the 
Netherlands and Austria, somewhere in midfield in the European Union. 
1.3. Data used  
The revenues and general government expenditure are taken into account on the 
basis of a variety of different logic and classification systems with - often substantial 
differences between countries and institutions in this respect. Our sources of data have 
been selected on the basis of three basic criteria for the purposes of this paper: the 
possibility of international comparison, the length and depth of detail of the available 
time series and the possibility to measure the impacts on the economy.  
On the revenue side ESA95 data (European Commission, 2003) are taken into 
account in respect of the EU Member States while - owing to the lack of official ESA95 
data - the accrual based tax and contribution data of the Hungarian Ministry of 
Finance, produced in the new GFS structure, are used12. The difference between the 
GFS and the ESA systems is presented in the Appendix. The calculation of the implicit 
tax rates also relies on the accounts of the Central Statistics Office containing data on 
the household sector in years 2001 and 2002. 
The international data of the expenditure side are also of the ESA95 structure with 
the Hungarian data originating from the ÁHÍR database of the Ministry of Finance, on 
consolidated cash flows. The Hungarian data of the tables presenting international 
comparison as well are estimates produced by the Budget Group of the Ministry of 
Finance in the ESA95 structure, which correspond to the EU data in terms of 
methodology. The data on the East European countries originate from the AMECO 
database of the European Commission which is also based on the ESA95 structure. 
2. The size of the general government  
The size of the general government is both a matter of efficiency and a choice of 
values. For the purpose of efficiency the entire distorting effect of the taxes needs to be 
assessed along with the amount of the resources taken by the state away from the 
economy for the performance of its tasks. These impacts should be measured in terms 
of the magnitude of the revenues. In an international comparison only the tax revenues 
are taken into account (including the revenues of the social security system as well) to 
                                          
11 László Szabó, an expert of the Monetary Policy Section of MoF has calculated the indicator for 
Hungary. 
12 Actual data of 1999-2002, preliminary data for 2003, based on the calculations of the General 
Government Finances Methodology and Statistics Section of MoF. The used data sources are described 
in more detail in the Annex. 
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eliminate the impacts of the revenues originating from privatisation and those not 
burdening the Hungarian economy. 13
The size of the general government is also determined by political value choices 
and by the institutional regime as well. The oft-cited typology of Esping-Andersen 
(1990, 1999) for instance, distinguishes between liberal, conservative and social-
democratic welfare systems,14 which show special differences in terms of the 
magnitudes and the structures of the expenditure as well (for instance the liberal 
systems provide benefits on a means-tested, while the social democrats would do so on 
a universal basis). Accordingly, the assessment of the welfare state obviously cannot be 
based only on size of the state or the magnitude of expenditure. 
The following figure shows that the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in Hungary is 
somewhat below the European Union average, but much higher than the Irish and 
somewhat above the Spanish and Portuguese level. 
Figure 1: Annual average* tax revenues as percentage of GDP  
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Source: European Commission (2003), Hungarian data: MoF (2004). Comment: In the 
case of the EU Member States covering the period between 1995 and 2001, In the case of 
Hungary calculated for the period between 1999 and 2003. 
The following figure shows the positive relationship observed in the EU 
Member States between the per capita income and the levels of the tax revenues: the 
richer a country, the larger share of the total output will be centralised by the state in 
the form of taxes and revenues. This relation does, of course, not necessarily mean a 
                                          
13 It is difficult to make a cross-sectional comparison because the revenues and expenditures may depend 
on the size of the country (due to the fixed cost of the government institutions) as well as financing 
options used for financing public functions. For example a social type tax benefit reduces tax revenues, 
while a subsidy for the same purpose increases the expenditures as well as tax revenues. E.g., Hjerppe 
(2003) describes the measuring problems in detail. 
14 For Hungary see Tóth (1994) and Lelkes (2000). 
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causal relationship. The tie between the two variables may result from a variety of 
factors: richer countries may spend more on public consumption, or the economies of 
countries spending more may be growing faster or both of these may even result from a 
common third factor. 
The Swedish and the Danish general governments operating larger welfare 
systems are relatively large while the Irish general government is very small in 
comparison to the level of development of the given economy. It should be noted that 
in the cohesion Member States (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) the tax 
revenue/GDP ratio was substantially - by 4-7 percentage points - lower than in 
Hungary during the above period while in Spain and Greece it grew steadily between 
1995 and 2001. 
 
Figure 2: The ratio of the tax revenue and the total income in the EU15 Member States 
and in the 7 new Member States in 2003 
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Comment: GDP/capita (in 2003, on PPS basis) and total tax revenues as a % of GDP in 
2003. In contrast to the other figures on tax revenues these data originate from the EU 
AMECO database since this is the database containing data on the new Member States 
as well. Consequently, some minor differences may be observed in comparison to the 
other data presented in the paper. Source:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_d
atabase/ameco_contents.htm, downloaded on 30 June 2004. 
 
Another clearly observed fact is that while in the case of the Baltic States, Spain 
and especially in Ireland with its liberal traditions the tax revenue/GDP ratio is lower 
than should be justified by the level of development of the economy, Hungary and 
Poland are above the regression line showing a higher tax revenue / GDP ratio than 
should be expected in view of the per capita GDP. In other words, the size of the state is 
relatively larger than would be justified by its economic output. 
In respect of the temporal trends: the ratio of tax revenues increased in Sweden 
and to some extent in Portugal, it declined in Ireland while the EU15 average varied 
between 40.8 % and 41.8 % in the period between 1995 and 2001. Accordingly, there is 
no definite trend of growth or decline though the tax revenues/GDP ratio dropped 
somewhat between 2000 and 2001 in half of the Member States. No definite trend is 
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observed in the Hungarian data series either though this may also be explained by the 
shortness of the time series.  
Figure 3: Tax revenues as percentage of GDP, international comparison  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
 
A longer Hungarian time series may be generated from cash based data. These 
indicate that the total revenue of the general government and the tax revenues as well 
(as a percentage of GDP) have been typically declining during the recent years with the 
exception of 2003 when a modest increase was shown. The following figure also 
indicates that the share of tax revenues has been steadily increasing within the total of 
revenues. 
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Figure 4: The expenditure and revenues of the Hungarian general government as a 
percentage of GDP 
 
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
 
20
01
20
02
*
20
03
*
Total expenditure
Total revenues
Tax revenues
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cash based data, MoF ÁHÍR database, consolidated revenues and expenditure, 
*2002 preliminary actual data, 2003 planned figures; AMECO database, GDP in terms 
of current prices, in HUF. 
Along with an apparently stable level of tax revenues relative to GDP the 
Hungarian tax revenues increased in real terms (at 1999 prices) between 1999 and 2003, 
i.e. the tax revenues more or less followed the growth of GDP. 
 
Figure 5: Development of the Hungarian tax revenues at 1999 prices (HUF billion) and 
as a percentage of GDP  
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Source: MoF (2004). 
3. The structure of revenues 
This chapter presents tax revenues at an aggregate level first, then in a 
breakdown by tax types, recipient level of government and economic functions. This is 
followed by a description of the implicit effective tax rates on consumption and labour 
income calculated on the basis of aggregate data.  
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3.1. Tax revenues according to tax types  
As has been noted in the introduction the type of taxes making up the tax 
revenues is an important factor. In respect of their different incentive effects three 
different categories should be distinguished; indirect taxes (those levied on products 
and services, including VAT, excise tax, consumption tax and customs), direct taxes 
(income and property taxes) and social security contributions paid by employers and 
employees. 
Proportion of social security contributions within total revenues in Hungary is 
higher than in the Baltic states and lower than in the other Visegrád countries. 
Contrarily, indirect taxes make up a low share compared to the Baltic states and a high 
share relative to the Czech and Slovak data.  
Figure 6: Tax revenues by tax type as percentages of the total tax revenues in 7 new EU 
Member States in 2003 
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Comment: In contrast to the other figures on tax revenues these data originate from the 
EU AMECO database since this is the database holding data on the new Member States 
as well. Consequently, some minor differences may be observed in comparison to the 
other data shown here. Source:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_d
atabase/ameco_contents.htm, downloaded on 30 June 2004  
 
Compared to the EU15 Member States, the ratio of indirect taxes and social 
security contributions is high and the ratio of direct taxes is low in Hungary, similarly 
to Portugal. 
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Figure 7: Tax revenues by tax types as a percentage of total tax revenues in the EU15 
countries and in Hungary, in 2001 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Be
lg
iu
m
Fi
nl
an
d
G
er
m
an
y
E
ur
oz
on
e
S
w
ed
en
H
ol
la
nd
ia
E
U
-1
5
Sp
ai
n
A
us
tri
a
Lu
xe
m
bu
rg
Fr
an
ce
D
en
m
ar
k
Ita
ly
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
gd
om
H
un
ga
ry
G
re
ec
e
P
or
tu
ga
l
Ire
la
nd
SSC
Direct taxes
Indirect taxes
 
Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
High rate of indirect tax revenues is more usual in countries with lower tax 
moral. This applies to the majority of the EU Member States with the exception of 
Ireland and the United Kingdom - both of them with traditionally liberal economic 
policies - where there are relatively higher ratios of indirect taxes despite the fact that 
the share of the black economy is moderate. 
Table 3: The black economy and the share of indirect taxes in the total revenues  
 Share of the black economy in GDP 
share of indirect taxes lower medium higher 
0  -31 %  
Germany 
Sweden  
 
32-36 % Austria 
Denmark 
France 
The Netherlands 
Greece  
Italy 
Spain 
37- 50  %  
Ireland 
United Kingdom  
Hungary  
Portugal 
Source: on the basis of data on the period between 1990 and 1993 Schneider, F. and D. 
Enste (2000) estimate the share of black economy as follows: Hungary: 20-28%, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Portugal: 24-30%, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, France, the Netherlands, 
Germany and the United Kingdom: 13-23 %, Austria: 8-10 %. The share of indirect taxes 
on the basis of year 2001 data, EU15 average: 33.7 %. 
In the theoretical introduction it was already mentioned that reliance on indirect 
taxes is supported by substantial efficiency arguments, therefore the expectation is that 
where the size of the general government is reduced to improve efficiency the weight 
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of indirect taxes will increase. We have analysed those two years during which the ratio 
of tax revenues to GDP declined in most of the EU15 Member States. As can be seen on 
the following figure, in general the ratio of tax revenues to GDP and the weight of 
indirect taxes within total tax revenues changed in an opposite direction between 2000 
and 2001. In other words where the share of tax revenues decreased the weight of 
indirect taxes increased and vice versa. 
Figure 8: The level of revenues and the change of the share of indirect taxes between 
2000 and 2001  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
As an average of the EU15 the ratio of the total tax revenues to GDP dropped by 
0.6 percentage points between 2000 and 2001 while the weight of indirect taxes declined 
by a marginal 0.1 percentage points. This is somewhat contrary to the EU expectation 
that while the tax revenue/GDP ratio should be reduced the weight of the indirect tax 
revenues should increase due to the decline of direct tax revenues and the increase of 
green (indirect) taxes. It is clear however that the average of the Euro 12 member states 
meets this expectation just as the Member States listed in the bottom right corner of the 
figure (such as Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and Finland). In Hungary the tax 
revenues/GDP ratio declined only marginally but the weight of the indirect tax 
revenues dropped substantially.  
3.2. Indirect taxes 
While the share of indirect taxes within total tax revenues in case of Hungary 
was close to the less developed EU Member States, the ratio of indirect tax revenues to 
GDP was high even compared to the EU average (due to the high total tax 
revenue/GDP ratio). The share of VAT revenues within the indirect taxes was higher in 
Hungary (54%) than the EU average (50%). 
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Figure 9: Indirect tax revenues according to the key tax types as a percentage of GDP, in 
2001 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
The EU average of the weight of indirect taxes and their ratio relative to GDP 
increased. As has already been mentioned the ratio of indirect taxes is high in Hungary, 
both within the total tax revenues and compared to GDP but does not have a definite 
trend. In the case of Ireland no definite trend is observed within the total of tax 
revenues either, but the weight of indirect taxes relative to GDP declined. In Portugal 
the ratio declined within the total of tax revenues but increased relative to GDP. 
 
Figure 10: Trend of indirect tax revenues within the total tax revenues  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
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 Figure 11: Trend of indirect tax revenues as a percentage of GDP  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
 
3.3. Direct taxes 
In the majority of the EU Member States the share of direct taxes increased 
within total tax revenues as well as a percentage of GDP: this trend is followed to some 
extent by Hungary as well. The share of direct tax revenues in Hungary is far below the 
EU average both as a percentage of GDP and as a share of total tax revenue. Without an 
analysis of data on an individual level however, it would be rather difficult to draw any 
conclusions. Although the share of PIT revenues is low in Hungary the activity rate is 
also very small. Therefore the smaller tax burden is shared by a smaller proportion of 
the population thus direct tax burden is probably high at the individual level. 
 
Figure 12: Direct tax revenues as a percentage of GDP, by tax type, 2001 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
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 Figure 13: Direct tax revenues as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
Figure 14: Trend of direct tax revenues within the total of tax revenues (%) 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
3.4. Social security contributions  
Revenues from social security contributions are very diverse at the EU Member 
States. The Hungarian ratio is close to the EU average but within social security 
contributions the part paid by the employers is very high. The trend of this is shown in 
more details in figure 16. 
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Figure 15: Distribution of social security contribution revenues as a percentage of GDP, 
2001 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
In the following figure a value above 1 shows that contributions paid by the 
employers exceed employees’ contributions (this is more frequently the case). The 
average EU value is somewhat below 3 (i.e. on average, the revenues from employers’ 
contributions are about three times the revenues from employees’ contributions) and 
did not vary much between 1995 and 2001. The ratio in Sweden was outstandingly high 
in 1995 but it dropped dramatically by 1999. The Spanish ratio is also worth mentioning 
- it is almost equal to the Hungarian ratio - but it is noteworthy that the ratio is not as 
high anywhere else as it is in Hungary although has been declining in Hungary too. 
Figure 16: The ratios of employers’ to employees’ social security contributions  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
The chart showing the trend of social security contributions supplements figure 
11 (trend of indirect tax revenues) and figure 14 (trend of direct tax revenues). 
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 Figure 17: Trend of social security contribution revenues as a percentage of the total tax 
revenue  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
3.5. Tax revenues by level of government 
International comparison is complicated by the fact that in a number of Member 
States operating in a federal system there is an additional level - that of the ‘state’ - 
between the central government and the local governments. A more precise picture 
would require information on whether this interim level takes on roles of the general 
government or those of local governments. It is clear from the figure however that if the 
province level is regarded similar to the central level then the Hungarian value is by 
some 3 percentage points lower than the average of the EU15. However, since no data 
is available in respect of the United Kingdom on the revenues of the social security 
funds, the data are indicative of an unrealistically large scale role for the central budget, 
accordingly, the actual EU15 average is assumed to be closer to the Hungarian value. It 
is clear from the figure that local governments have the relatively largest revenues in 
the Scandinavian countries: in Sweden, Finland and Denmark they receive 29.3 %, 22.1 
% and 33.8 % of the total tax revenues, respectively. This is followed by Italy with a 
substantially lower, 14.1 % share of local governmental revenues. The EU institutions 
are allocated only 0.4 - 2.1 % of the tax revenues. 
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 Figure 18: Tax revenues by levels of government as percentages of total revenues, in 
2001 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
Fi
nl
an
d
S
pa
in
Ita
ly
S
w
ed
en
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
B
el
gi
um
H
un
ga
ry
A
us
tri
a
D
en
m
ar
k
P
or
tu
ga
l
E
U
-1
5
Lu
xe
m
bu
rg
G
re
ed
e
Ire
la
nd
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
EU institution
Social sec.
funds
Local gov't
State
Central gov't
 
Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
A slight but definite growth is observed in the EU average of the shares 
provided from total tax revenues to the local governments. Hungary is at the middle of 
the range and follows the growth trend. The share of tax revenues allocated to the local 
governments is outstandingly high in the Scandinavian countries (falling between 22 
and 33 %), while these ratios are very low (1-6%) in Greece, Portugal and Ireland.  
 
Figure 19: The revenues of local governments as percentages of the total tax revenues  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
3.6. Tax revenues by economic functions  
The following is a description of the composition of tax revenues by economic 
function, i.e. taxes on capital income, labour income and consumption. In case of 
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Hungary the GFS statistics used so far do not contain data on the tax revenues in a 
breakdown from which it would be possible to clearly calculate these data, therefore 
the Hungarian data presented here are expert estimates.15  
 
Figure 20: Tax revenues on capital, labour and consumption as percentages of the total 
tax revenue, 2001 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
Although tax systems of the Member States vary largely according to the types 
of incomes taxed more substantially, it is clear that the tax revenue on capital incomes 
is lower in Hungary than in almost each of the countries concerned. Although the taxes 
on labour do not differ from the EU average but in the less affluent Member States 
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) the share of tax revenues from labour income is 
much lower within the total of tax revenues. It should also be noted that this aggregate 
information does not provide comparable information on the individual level of tax 
burden as the rate of activity varies substantial from country to country. 
                                          
15 Following the procedure of the European Commission (2003), the estimate is based on the following 
assumptions:  
- Part of personal income tax revenues relating to self-employed are tax revenues charged to capital, so 
the PIT revenues within one line may be broken down based on an assumption. The method: on the 
basis of the average of EU Member States (PIT revenues from self-employed)/(total PIT revenues) the 
ratio is approximately 1.5 times the data (Social security contribution of self-employed)/(total social 
security contribution), which are also supported by other, APEH statistics in relation to Hungarian data. 
Therefore we relied on this assumption for the distribution of PIT revenues between capital and work.  
- The line Taxes on property may contain a small amount of tax on consumption, and the line Taxes on 
goods and services may contain a small amount of tax on capital, which we cannot take into account. This 
causes some inaccuracy in the calculated data, but its size will probably not distort the result. 
- The breakdown of Other taxes line among the three functions is not clear either, the total amount in this 
line has been taken into account among taxes charged on capital.. 
Due to the reasons indicated above the Hungarian data are not accurate, but they clearly illustrate the 
size. On the basis of all this, we have decided to provide figures based on our own calculations, as there 
were no more accurate data available. 
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The following figure clearly shows that Hungary relies less on tax revenues from 
capital income than the EU average. A definitely growing trend is seen in the Member 
States which was also followed by Hungary up to 2002. 
 
Figure 21: Trend of tax revenues on capital incomes as percentages of total tax revenues  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
In Hungary, similarly to Portugal or Ireland, the share of tax revenues on 
consumption is rather high, far in excess of the EU15 average. As has already been 
mentioned herein in countries with lower tax moral indirect taxes make up a larger 
share of the total tax revenues, as shown in table 3. Since there is a substantial overlap 
between indirect taxes and those on consumption the high ratio of indirect taxes is 
usually accompanied by a high ratio of tax revenues on consumption.  
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Figure 22: Trend of tax revenues on consumption as percentages of total tax revenues  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
The share of tax revenues from labour income within the total tax revenues has 
been steadily declining in the Member States. This trend was not followed by Hungary 
between 1999 and 2002 - some decline was observed only in 2003. This figure also 
emphasises that for instance the share of revenues from labour income is much lower in 
Portugal and Ireland than in Hungary. 
 
Figure 23: Trend of tax revenues from labour income as percentages of total tax revenues 
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
3.7. Implicit tax rates  
After an analysis of the tax burden on consumption and labour income as 
percentages of GDP and the tax revenues it is worth assessing what implicit 
consumption and income tax rates these entail with respect to aggregate consumption 
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and income from labour16. Since the GFS data covers only the government sector, the 
household sector accounts provided by the Central Statistics Office on years 2001 and 
2002 have been used for the aggregate consumption and labour data of the tax base. 
As is shown by the following figure a much higher implicit tax rate is applied in 
Hungary on consumption than the EU15 average. This is partly in line with the high 
rate of tax revenues from consumption. However the figure also shows that although 
tax revenues from consumption were high in Portugal as well, the implicit tax rate is 
low in Portugal. The reason for this might be that in Portugal the aggregate tax base is 
much broader than in Hungary, i.e. the allowances are granted to a smaller range of 
taxpayers. Sweden shows an example opposite to that of Portugal as the rate of tax 
revenues from consumption was low despite a high implicit tax rate.  
 
Figure 24: Implicit tax rates on consumption in 2001, %  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004) and Central 
Statistics Office (2004). Comment: on the basis of the European Commission (2003) 
method the calculation of the implicit tax rate on consumption is as follows: total tax 
revenues on consumption/household consumption data (In the ESA95 structure the 
P31_S14dom line is the denominator).  
In parallel with the implicit tax rate on consumption the implicit tax rate on 
labour income is also very high in Hungary: it is also much higher than the EU15 
average while figures 20 and 23 showed that the ratio of tax revenues on income from 
labour is near to the EU15 average in Hungary. This is a result of the high rate of 
inactivity in Hungary that is the fact that a smaller share of the population finances the 
same percentage of the tax revenues. 
                                          
16 For each tax type the implicit tax rate is calculated as the revenues of the given tax type divided by the 
applicable tax base. Naturally, the analysis should also extend to the implicit tax rate charged on capital 
income, but because of the lack of data this part of the analysis cannot be completed for Hungary.  
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 Figure 25: Implicit tax rates on labour income in 2001  
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Source: European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004) and CSO (2004). 
Comment: Based on European Commission (2003) the implicit tax rate on labour 
income = total tax revenue from all labour income / (labour income + payroll taxes). 
The denominator is the sum of lines (D1+D29C) in the ESA95 structure. 
It should be noted that in general a higher than average tax revenue from 
consumption is accompanied by a lower than average tax revenue from labour income 
while a high implicit consumption tax rate is accompanied by a low implicit tax rate on 
labour income. Examples for this are shown by Portugal and Ireland. This is a result of 
the fact that both tax types are levied in essence on the household sector as this is the 
sector that pays the indirect taxes making up a substantial part of taxes on 
consumption.  
But in the case of Hungary the ratios of tax revenues both from consumption 
and from labour income are high just as the two implicit tax rates. Although we do not 
have adequate data on the implicit tax rate on capital income but it is likely on the basis 
of the law ratio of tax revenues from capital that this is also low. Which would mean 
that households are bearing larger burdens in Hungary than are enterprises generating 
the largest part of capital incomes. 
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 Figure 26: Trend of the average implicit tax rate on consumption and labour income in 
the EU15 and Hungary  
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Comment: In the case of Hungary the tax rate on consumption dropped from 28.6 % to 
27.4 % while the tax rate on labour income declined from 42.5 % to 42.2 %. Source: 
European Commission (2003), the Hungarian data: MoF (2004). 
On the basis of the two series of data showing the EU15 average it is clear that in 
accordance with the announced principles the tax rate on labour income has been 
declining steadily from 1998 and that after a slight increase of the tax rate on 
consumption it has also declined somewhat since 1999. While before 1998 the two 
trends were more ore less contrary to one another i.e. the aggregate tax burden on 
households did not change much, from 1999 the two trends together has resulted in a 
decline of the tax burden on households. The Hungarian data on 2001 and 2002 also 
shows some decline in terms of the implicit tax rates but this is not very substantial in 
respect of the tax rate on labour income. Furthermore, in accordance with the above 
figures it is clear again here that in the case of Hungary both tax rates are substantially 
higher than the EU average: by almost 5.5 % in the case of labour income and by about 
8 % in the case of consumption, i.e. the total tax levied on households is much larger in 
Hungary than in the EU15. 
 
4. The structure of general government expenditure  
This chapter gives a review first of the magnitude of the current expenditure 
along with its composition and changes which will be followed by an overview of the 
distribution of the expenditure on welfare and those on the operational functions of the 
state. A brief description of the distribution of expenditure by the levels of the public 
administration system will also be provided. As has already been noted in the 
introduction most of the Hungarian data are cash based while the international data 
describe the general government expenditure in an accrual based approach. 
4.1. An international comparison of general government expenditure  
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Figure 27 shows the share of total expenditure relative to GDP in the EU15 
countries and Hungary in year 2001. The total expenditure relative to GDP is widely 
distributed within the European Union. In 2001 the largest amount was spent on this in 
Sweden (57.1 %) and Denmark (55.3 %), the smallest shares of expenditure was 
observed in Ireland (33.9%) and Luxembourg (39%). With 48.9 % Hungary is 
somewhere in mid-field somewhat above the average of the EU15 countries. 
 
Figure 27: The total general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 2001 
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Source: International data: EUROSTAT, Hungarian data: calculations of the Budget 
Department of the Ministry of Finance.  
The following figure shows the change of general government expenditure 
during 2001 and 2004 in selected East European countries. The degree of redistribution 
– measured as the ratio of total expenditure to GDP - was not higher in the 10 new EU 
member states on average than the EU15 average. The degree of redistribution was, 
however, higher in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, than the average. In the 
majority of the new Member States redistribution by the state has been declining but 
this trend will appear in Hungary only in the projection on year 2005 which is not 
shown in the figure.  
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Figure 28: Total expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the new Member States and in 
the EU15 countries between 2001 and 2004 
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Source: AMECO database. Comment: 2003: preliminary actual data, 2004: projection.  
 
The scale of income redistribution by the state was around the level of the EU15 
countries in 2001 as was shown in figure 27. This level was a result of a substantial 
restructuring process and as has been indicated by the changes observed during recent 
years, it cannot be considered ‘stable’.  
The magnitude of the total general government expenditure has been declining 
since 1993 but in a short run the trend has also been influenced by the general election 
periods every four years. With the exception of the first election term there seems to 
have been a trend showing a decline in expenditure after the election year and then a 
growth approaching the next election year. This was clearly observed in 1998 and 
especially in 2002. It should be noted though that this is also generally witnessed in 
more developed countries. 
The ratio of total general government expenditure to GDP increased up to 1993. 
This was followed by a substantial (almost 15 percentage point) decline by 1996, and 
after that it was between 50 and 55 %. As is presented in the following figure as well, 
the first growth phase up to 1993 was substantial primarily among the GDP-
proportionate expenditure while expenditure at constant prices - adjusted by inflation - 
increased only slightly. The growth of the first ratio therefore results primarily from the 
decline of the real value of GDP. The second phase - years 1995 and 1996 - brought 
about a significant decline both in terms of real value and as a percentage of GDP. 
Thereafter expenditure gradually increased between 1997 and 2002, by about a total of 
30 %, in real terms (see figure 29). Nevertheless the level of expenditure changed 
moderately as a percentage of GDP as is explained by the growth of the real value of 
GDP. 
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Figure 29: Total general government expenditure between 1991 and 2002  
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Source: Ministry of Finance, ÁHÍR database 
To what extent have been the above general trends representative of the various 
types of expenditure? Has the system of state tasks changed and if it has, in what way? 
These are the questions to which we will first be seeking for answers in the following 
sections. 
4.2. General government expenditure in a functional breakdown  
A number of international institutions apply the so-called COFOG 
(Classification of Functions of Government) standard for the measurement of 
governmental functions which is a system enabling comparison between the size and 
composition of governmental sectors of different countries. The table in the appendix 
will also give a detailed description of the general government expenditure. The 
functional categorisation system distinguishes between four categories: (1) The group 
of state operational functions includes administration, foreign affairs, defence, security in 
law and order as well as the administration of justice. (2) The category of welfare 
functions includes education, health, social security, social/welfare services organised 
or subsidised by the government along with similar housing and other services, (3) the 
group of economic functions includes economic operations organised and subsidised by 
the state and their development (e.g. energy sector, agriculture, transport, 
telecommunication). (4) The category of national debt management includes interest 
payments relating to the financing of the national debt. 
Figure 30 shows the development of real expenditure of the four categories 
during the period under review. Interest payments grew substantially by 1997 while 
those on welfare functions declined. A significant growth was observed in the 
expenditure on welfare functions in the second half of the decade under review. These 
expenditures increased at a rate higher than that of inflation between 1997 and 2002 as 
a result of which the real value of the expenditure on welfare functions was by 2002 
again at the level recorded in 1992. The substantial increase of the real value of the 
expenditure on economic functions should also be highlighted though the largest 
proportion was recorded in 2002 in relation to the growth of the expenditure on 
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motorway construction. (A comparison of the interest revenues as a percentage of GDP 
and in real terms is presented in the Appendix.) 
 
Figure 30: Key expenditure items at constant 2002 prices, between 1991 and 2002 (HUF 
billion) 
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The trends that can be observed in respect of the composition of the total 
expenditure are identical with those outlined above: the ratio of interest payments had 
increased by 1997 and the largest decline was observed in the share of welfare 
expenditure within the total. In 2002 welfare expenditure accounted for a smaller 
proportion within the total expenditure than at the beginning of the period under 
review while those spent on the operation of the state accounted for a somewhat higher 
proportion.  
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Figure 31: Development of the composition of general government expenditure 
between 1991 and 2002  
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In the early 1990s the deficit grew at an accelerating rate in comparison to the 
declining rate of GDP growth. As a result of the increase in government debt the ratio 
of interest payments   also grew, significantly restricting the room for manoeuvre for 
the budget policy. No reform covering the expenditure and the revenue side of the 
general government system took place but significant changes had been introduced 
between 1992 and 1997 in a number of important areas. The adoption of the Central 
bank Act, the adoption of the Act on Public Finances, the creation of the Government 
Debt Management Agency and the Treasury and then the transfer of the ‘zero debt’ to 
the budget provided for the management of the national debt on a commercial basis 
and made it more transparent (for more detail see Barabás et al. 1998). The effectiveness 
of the welfare expenditure was improved by the introduction of performance financing 
in the health sector, the reform of the pension system and the removal of the non-
insurance based benefits from the social security system. The adoption of the Act on 
Public Procurements and the substantial reduction of the number of extra budgetary 
funds resulted in an increasing transparency of expenditures. 
 
4.3. Welfare expenditure  
Special attention needs to be paid to the development of expenditure within the 
range of welfare functions for this type of expenditure includes such traditional state 
functions as education, health or social security and social/welfare expenditure. The 
expenditure falling in this category account for more than half of the total expenditure.  
In 2001 Hungary 28.1 % of GDP is spent on welfare functions (education, health, 
social security, housing subsidies) which is higher than the corresponding figure 
observed in the cohesion countries and lower than the EU average. The growth in 2002 
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to 29.9 % brought Hungary somewhat closer to the EU average, which was 32.4 % in 
2001.  
 
Figure 32.a: Expenditure on welfare functions in 2001, as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: International data: EUROSTAT, Hungarian data: Based on calculations of the 
Budget Department at the Ministry of Finance.  
 
A more precise picture is obtained if one considers the welfare and the economic 
expenditures together in the case of Hungary, where a significant part of the latter (e.g. 
travelling cost reimbursement, subsidies for agricultural producers) also serve welfare 
purposes. Figure 32.b shows that if the two functions are taken together, the level of 
expenditure in Hungary is close to the European Union average and it is relatively high 
in comparison to the economic performance of Hungary. It should be noted that the 
above data provide little information on the quality of the performance of the welfare 
functions: aggregate data are not suitable for the assessment of this aspect. 
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Figure 32.b: Expenditures on social/welfare and economic functions as a percentage of 
GDP, 2001 
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Source: International data: EUROSTAT, Hungarian data: Based on calculations of the 
Budget Department at the Ministry of Finance. 
The largest item within the social/welfare function is that of social benefits 
accounting for 18.8 % of the GDP of the European Union. Substantial differences are 
observed between the various countries, Denmark spends almost 15 percentage points 
more on this function than Ireland. The expenditure on social services in Hungary 
accounted for 14.7 % of GDP in 2001. This is followed in terms of magnitude by health 
and education. In 2001, expenditure on the health system was lower in Hungary than 
the EU average while expenditure on education was higher than that.  
Figure 33 shows the change of the real expenditure on welfare. Welfare 
expenditure was substantially influenced by the measures introduced as part of the 
austerity package in 1995. Inflation increased due to the devaluation of the HUF which 
had a direct impact on the real value of expenditure of the social security system. 
Pensions continued to increase at the rate of the growth of wages which was much 
lower than inflation in those days. Rules on the provision of the child care aid and fee, 
the family allowance and sickness benefits were tightened, tuition fees were introduced 
in the higher education system, budgetary support on medicines was reduced and 
became more targeted and fees were introduced for dental services.  
The real value of welfare expenditures on each of the above reviewed groups 
increased between 1997 and 2002 with the largest increases observed in education, 
social security and social/welfare expenditures. A particularly large increase was 
observed in 2002, as a result of the increase in public servants’ salaries and the 
withdrawal of some measures (e.g. those on the family allowance). 
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 Figure 33: Welfare functions at constant (2002) prices, between 1991 and 2002, in HUF 
billion  
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Source: Ministry of Finance, ÁHÍR database 
The composition of welfare expenditure did not change much in respect of the 
whole period under review: the share of none of the categories changed by more than 3 
percentage points within the total of welfare expenditures. For this reason figure 34 
shows the composition only for the years 1992 and the 2002. By 2002 the share of 
education and health expenditure had increased while somewhat less was spent on 
social security and social/welfare services.  
 
Figure 34: Key items within the total expenditures on welfare functions, between 1992 
and 2002 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, ÁHÍR database 
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4.4. Expenditure on public administration  
The weight of state operational functions in Hungary is relatively high in 
comparison to other countries17 and during the last years (with the exception of 2002) it 
has been growing. From the aspect of economic impact this is a mixed group of 
expenditures: some items have a direct stimulus on economic growth while others - 
although with fundamental importance - have no measurable impact on the economy. 
This is why we shall now give a brief overview of the items whose financing has grown 
within the category of state functions. 
Figure 35: State operation functions at 2002 prices, between 1991 and 2002, in HUF 
billion  
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Source: MoF ÁHÍR database. 
The above figure shows three sub-groups of operational state functions (public 
services, public order and defence) and the group of general public services in a 
detailed breakdown. The figure indicates that expenditure on public services grew the 
fastest, but within that, expenditure on other community services showed the smallest 
growth. Nearly one-third of other services consist of basic research: this expenditure 
item may promote long-term growth. Within expenditure on other services, the 
proportion of this has continuously decreased during the second half of the 1990s and 
started to increase again after 2000. In real terms, expenditure on basic research 
increased by and large at the same rate as general public services between 1999 and 
2002. 
4.5. General government expenditure in an economic breakdown 
Usually four main categories are distinguished in the economic grouping of 
general government. (1) The group of current expenditure and subsidies include expenditure 
on public services (personnel remuneration, employer’s contributions as well as the 
purchase of products and services), subsidies (current subsidies to households, 
subsidies for private businesses and non-profit organisations) and interest payments. 
(2) The most important items within capital expenditure and subsidies are gross capital 
formation and refurbishment, as well as various subsidies. Loans financed from the 
                                          
17 The international comparative data are in the Annex. 
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general government (3) and certain items that cannot be classified in economic terms (4) 
make up separate categories. 
In Hungary, current and capital expenditure make up 98-99 per cent of all 
expenditure, within which the proportion of current expenditure is the largest. The 
proportion of current expenditure to interest payments is relatively stable. The change 
in their proportion did not exceed 2-3% points during the period investigated, except 
that the proportion of capital expenditure increased from 12.8% to 17.5% from 2001 to 
2002, but still, current expenditure makes up more than 80 per cent of all expenditure. 
The structure of current expenditure was far from stable in the last decade. More 
precisely, the proportion of expenditure spent on public services stabilised at 40 per 
cent after the first election cycle and showed a slight increase only in recent years. On 
the other hand, the proportion of interest expenditure reached a rate of below 10 per 
cent as well as over 20 per cent over the period, mostly moving opposite with the 
economic cycle. After 1994, the proportion of subsidies was the inverse of interest 
payments. 
 
Figure 36: Development of the composition of current expenditure in Hungary 
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Source: Ministry of Finance, ÁHÍR database 
Figure 37 presents the structure of current expenditure in more detail, in 
comparison with some of the acceding countries and the average of the EU-15 (see the 
Appendix for detailed figures on the 15 EU Member States). 
Benefits not in kind (i.e. provided in cash) includes benefits related to sickness, 
accidents or motherhood, and benefits in kind include items such as health care, 
nursery and kindergarten care and travel allowances. Public consumption includes 
classical public goods such as public administration, defence, maintenance of public 
areas and disaster protection. Naturally, interest payments indicate expenditure related 
to national debt management, and the category of subsidies includes pecuniary benefits 
given to producers.18
                                          
18 A description of each category is available at the following address (downloaded on 18 May 2004): 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_data/ggd012004en.pd
f 
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In Hungary’s case, the structure of expenditure is not very different from the EU 
average; only the proportion of community consumption and benefits not provided in 
kind show a significant difference. In the new Member States for which data was 
available, the proportion of interest payments in 2002 was highest in Hungary. 
 
Figure 37: The structure of current expenditure as a percentage of GDP in some new 
Member States and in the EU-15 in 2002 
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Source: AMECO database 
4.6. General government by level of government 
Public finances are divided into four large sub-systems: by level of public 
administration the distinction is the following: (1) central budget, (2) budgets of local 
governments, (3) social security and (4) separate funds. 
At the beginning of the decade (as shown by non-consolidated figures) the 
budget of local governments amounted to 20-21 per cent of expenditure. According to 
consolidated figures available for later years, the proportion of local governments 
increased slightly between 1998 and 2001, from 21 to 24.4 %, after which it dropped to 
22% in 2002. The weight of local governments’ expenditure has always changed in the 
opposite direction to the weight of the central budget in recent years, while the share of 
social security continuously increased. 
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 Figure 38: Distribution of expenditure by sub-systems, % 
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Source: ÁHÍR database, cash based figures according to the GFS approach. 
 
As regards the functional breakdown, we find that state operational tasks and 
economic tasks are financed typically by the central budget (see figure 39). Welfare 
functions are provided primarily by social security (42-43%) and local governments 
(30%), the proportion of the central budget in this is relatively low (25-26%). The 
distribution of tasks changed in a way that the role of central budget increased 
continuously and practically became exclusive in performing economic functions by 
2002, while a slow decrease can be seen in performing welfare functions. 
 
Figure 39: Share of the central budget in the total general government expenditure, % 
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Source: ÁHÍR database, cash based figures according to the GFS approach. 
The consideration according to which public services should be provided at the 
level of administration where they are the most efficient would be an argument in 
favour of strengthening fiscal decentralisation. The quality of financing and spending 
decisions is usually improved if decisions are made close to the users. Naturally, the 
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desirable rate of decentralisation may differ according to the nature of individual 
functions and should also be aligned to the community structure that has developed. 
According to the data surveys cited by Kopányi (2001) the unfavourable 
experience of the Hungarian government model ensuring a great degree of 
decentralisation, which was created in 1990, is explained by the weaknesses of the 
financing system and the shortfalls in the professional skills of local governments, but 
this should not be remedied by re-centralisation. 
5. Summary and possible directions for further research 
5.1. Summary 
We consider three criteria to summarise the conclusions drawn from macro-level 
general government data. The first of these is Hungary’s accession to the EU, which 
may necessitate changes in particular areas of expenditure and revenues. The second 
criterion concerns stability and long-term growth; the third is that of redistributive 
impacts. 
EU integration 
The structure of revenues approaches the European Union’s average in most 
dimensions. The exception to this is the distribution of taxes on capital and labour: 
taxes and social security contributions levied on labour are much higher, while taxes on 
capital are lower than in most Member States. The advantages of integration may be 
realised via the free movement of capital and labour, which provides an incentive to 
harmonise the tax structure. For acceding countries, on the other hand, it may be 
reasonable to keep capital taxes at a level below average in the short run, to promote 
the influx of foreign direct investment and domestic investments, in order to accelerate 
economic convergence. 
In the composition of expenditure, the share of debt service decreased, and 
additional funds were allocated to public administration tasks instead of welfare tasks. 
This trend increases the distance from the EU-15 average. The economic breakdown of 
expenditure also indicated that the proportion of public consumption - which covers by 
and large the cost of public administration – in Hungary is higher than the average of 
the EU-15, as well as most of the new acceding countries, while the proportion of 
welfare benefits in cash is lower in Hungary. On the other hand, harmonisation of 
expenditures is not justified by efficiency considerations – to the contrary, once the 
monetary union is achieved, fiscal policy will remain the sole tool for governments to 
manage country-specific shocks. Therefore, changes in the structure of expenditure 
should be evaluated in terms of stabilisation, growth and redistributive effect. 
Stability and growth 
Hungarian public spending is relatively high, which may limit the expansion of 
private investment. Adjusting for the level of production, the rate of income 
redistribution is high even compared to other European countries. Between 1995 and 
1999, tax revenues compared to GDP decreased significantly but continue to be high, 
and the decreasing trend has slowed down in recent years. 
The level of expenditure is also high, and shows an increasing trend since 2000 
despite expert recommendations. The data reveal no sign of a systematic counter-
cyclical fiscal policy either on the expenditure or on the revenue side. 
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In most dimensions, changes in the structure of revenues are to strengthen 
economic incentives. The share of indirect taxes on income, which are neutral, i.e. not 
distorting the decisions of economic actors, is relatively large and is in keeping with the 
increasing trend that may be seen in EU Member States. On the other hand, wage taxes 
and social security contributions, and this is particularly true for employers’ 
contributions. This is a counterincentive on both the supply and the demand side of the 
labour market, and may increase the share of unregistered labour. However, as it has 
been already mentioned, the low level of taxes on capital may help to increase 
investments. 
The most important change in the composition of expenditures was the increase 
in the share of general public services, which may be favourable for growth to the 
extent that it improved quality – however, this is questionable because public 
administration reform has not taken place. Some of the increased spending went to 
basic research, which should certainly be considered favourable. 
Finally, the role of local governments is considerable primarily in welfare 
expenditure but is low and decreasing in terms of expenditure on economic functions. 
The role played by the municipality level in the allocation of expenditure increased 
during the second half of the 1990s but this trend seems have reversed in 2002. This 
trend may reduce the efficiency of public spending because efficiency is usually higher 
if decisions are made at the local level, close to users. 
Redistribution 
As already indicated, in addition to the high taxes on labour income, 
consumption is also subject to relatively high taxes, while the tax burden on capital is 
relatively low. This structure has been relatively stable since 1999 except for minor 
adjustments, which slightly increased the proportion of taxes on capital and reduced 
the tax burden on labour by 2003. The share of welfare functions within expenditures is 
high (although not as high as in other EU Member States) and the same is true in 
proportion to GDP, particularly if considered together with economic expenditure, 
some of which serves welfare functions as well. These together result in redistribution 
being less favourable for middle or low-income groups compared to other countries. In 
the short run, however, it might be reasonable to maintain this structure because it 
helps faster convergence to EU income levels. However, it is important for the welfare 
system to improve that the targeting of benefits, so that welfare expenditure helps 
those who are most in need of it. 
5.2. Directions for further research 
This paper provided an overview of the structure of public finances at the 
aggregate level.  We propose four directions in which more detailed and more through 
research may prove especially useful for government policy making. 
Short-term equilibrium and automatic stabilisers 
In the average of an economic cycle, the budgets of Member States of the 
monetary union should be around equilibrium or have a positive balance. The budget 
may have a deficit if this serves to mitigate recession in the declining stage of the cycle. 
A tool recommended for this is the application of automated stabilisers: these include 
unemployment benefit, the aggregate amount of which increases during recession and 
decreases during a boom. In the case of Hungary, pension benefits are also classified 
here due to the particular indexing methods. In order to prepare for the monetary 
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union, it is important to investigate how these automatic stabilisers worked in the 
recent period, and how sensitively they reacted to changes in output. The review 
requires analysing time series data and may therefore encounter several difficulties 
because time series – which are short as they are – are broken by changes in the system 
of economic institutions and external shocks at several points. 
Long-term growth effects of general government expenditure 
In order to precisely reveal the long-term effects, a more detailed analysis is 
required including a finer breakdown of revenue and expenditure items. The starting 
point for this may be the system of indicators developed by the EU, as mentioned in the 
introduction. 
Long-term sustainability of public finances 
The current structure of the system of taxes and benefits, of expenditure and 
revenues contains many liabilities for future expenditure while revenues depend very 
much on external factors that the government is barely able to influence, if at all. For 
instance, the ageing of the population threatens the equilibrium of the pension and 
health care system, so it is important to calculate the expected impacts as soon as 
possible and perform the necessary transformation on regulations in order to preserve 
stability; such calculations have already been prepared for the pension system. One of 
the tools for sustainability analyses is generational accounts, which have already been 
constructed for Hungary. 
Micro level analysis of the tax system and public spending  
In addition to the above, it is also worthwhile to look at the distortions caused by 
the tax system and the extent to which it deviates the economy from efficient operation, 
and whether expenditures yield the expected results and if so, how efficiently (i.e. 
would it have been possible to obtain the same results at a lower cost). Such an analysis 
involves looking for a relationship between employer’s contributions and demand for 
labour, or comparing the amount spent on active labour market instruments and the 
growth in employment realised with the help of these, or reduction achieved in the 
proportion of the unemployed. Looking at whether the transformation of a form of 
welfare benefit or tax benefit reduced imbalances in income to the expected extent is 
also in the scope of this activity. These issues may be investigated by using micro level 
data, with the help of individual, household and company level databases. A possible 
methodology tool is micro simulation modelling, the adaptation of which has already 
started within the Ministry of Finance. 
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7. Appendix 
A. Statistical methodology: data used 
Data used on the revenue side 
• Tax and contribution figures in a GFS (Government Finance Statistics) structure with 
accrual based actual data for 1999-2002, preliminary data for 2003 from the Ministry 
of Finance (2004). 
• Data for the households sector from national accounts for the years 2001-2002 of CSO. 
• In the case of the EU Member States, data according to the ESA95 (European Standard 
of Accounts) from the European Commission (2003). 
Data used for the expenditure side 
• Hungary: Partly consolidated figures with a cash based from the Ministry of 
Finance’s ÁHÍR database. Sourcing of the cash movements within public finances did 
not include employer’s contributions. These items should also be filtered in order to 
investigate the impact on demand, but in this paper the point was to look at the 
structure of expenditures. 
• Hungarian data estimated by the budget group of the Ministry of Finance, in an 
ESA95 structure. 
• International data: according to the ESA-95 methodology. 
• Eastern European countries: ESA 95 data from the European Commission’s AMECO 
database19 (EUROSTAT actual data and projections of DG ECFIN). 
Difference between GFS and ESA 95 
The calculations presented below indicate that the GFS structure slightly 
underestimates tax revenue compared to the ESA95 structure, and within that, it 
underestimates revenue from social security contributions and overestimates direct tax 
revenues. There is no significant difference for indirect tax revenues. 
 
Table A1. ESA95-GFS comparison, 2000-2001 (billion HUF and %) 
 2000 2001 
Tax revenues - GFS (Bn HUF) 5201,066 5837,94 
Tax revenues - ESA (Bn HUF) 5350,419 5969,72 
Tax/GDP – GFS 39,48% 39,31% 
Tax/GDP – ESA 40,62% 40,20% 
 
Comment: Own calculations based on Hungarian data available for 2000-01 in the 
ESA95 structure and official GFS data. 
                                          
19 Available at the following address (downloaded 18 May 2004):  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_
en.htm 
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Figure A1: ESA95-GFS comparison, 2000-2001 (billion HUF and %) 
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Figure A2: Distribution of tax revenue by major tax types within total tax revenue in the 
GFS and ESA95 structure, 2000-2001 
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The difference between cash based and accrual based accounting 
• Cash based accounting follows the actual cash movements that took place in the course 
of the year. Accrual based accounting takes into account the liabilities and rightful 
receivables generated but there may be great differences in the accuracy in the 
accounts prepared, depending on what items are accrued the year when they are 
generated. 
• Accrual based figures are more suitable for investigating the distorting effects of 
economic policy but are not always available in Hungary, so we also used cash based 
data, and there may be differences in the contents of cash based data depending on 
what source the originate from. 
B. Public revenue: Summary tables of the tax systems of EU Member States and Hungary 
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Table B1: Hungarian tax revenue data 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total tax revenues on current prices (Bn HUF) 4 522 5 201 5 838 6 502 7 291 
Total tax revenues on 1999 prices (Bn HUF) 4 522 4 738 5 347 6 176 6 966 
Total tax revenues as % of GDP 39,7% 39,5% 39,3% 38,8% 40,2% 
 
Table B2: Tax revenue, individual years and annual average over the period as 
percentage of GDP, EU15 Member States and Hungary 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average* 
Belgium 45,1 45,4 45,8 46,4 46 46 46   45,8 
Denmark 49,3 49,9 49,8 50,1 51,5 49,5 49,8   50 
Germany 41,3 42,1 42,1 42,1 42,9 42,9 41,2   42,1 
Greece 32,6 33 34,3 36,3 37,2 38,5 36,8   35,5 
Spain 33,4 33,8 34,2 34,5 35,2 35,7 35,6   34,6 
France 44 45 45,2 45,1 45,7 45,3 45,4   45,1 
Ireland 33,4 33,5 32,8 32,1 31,9 32,3 31,2   32,5 
Italy 41,2 42,8 44,7 43,2 43,3 42,7 42,6   42,9 
Luxemburg 42,4 42,4 41,6 40,2 40,8 41,3 41,8   41,5 
Netherlands 40,6 40,8 40,7 40,3 41,7 41,5 40   40,8 
Austria 42,4 43,9 44,7 44,4 44,4 43,5 45,6   44,1 
Portugal 33,6 34,4 34,7 34,9 36 36,4 35,9   35,1 
Finland 46,2 47,4 46,8 46,6 47 48 46   46,9 
Sweden 49,1 51,9 52 53,6 53 52,5 54,1   52,3 
United Kingdom 35,4 35,1 35,6 36,8 36,9 37,6 37,5   36,4 
EU15 40,8 41,5 41,6 41,6 41,8 41,7 41,1   41,4 
Euro12 41,1 42 42,4 42 42,5 42,3 41,5   42 
Hungary     39,7 39,5 39,3 38,8 40,2 39,5 
* Where relevant, average for the EU Member States means the average calculated for 
the period 1995-2001 while for Hungary it means the average calculated for the period 
between 1999-2003 in the tables of the Annex 
Table B.3: GDP per capita (in 2003, on PPS basis) and total tax revenue as a percentage 
of GDP in 2003 
 GDP/capita 
(1000 PPS) 
Tax revenues/GDP 
(%) 
Belgium 26,0 47,5 
Denmark 27,3 50,2 
Germany 24,1 41,6 
Greece 17,8 38,8 
Spain 21,2 36,7 
France 25,3 45,6 
Ireland 29,2 31,5 
Italy 23,9 41,7 
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Netherlands 26,6 40,0 
Austria 27,0 45,6 
Portugal 16,7 38,5 
Finland 24,6 44,6 
Sweden 25,4 51,3 
United Kingdom 26,5 37,0 
EU15 24,3 41,6 
Czech Republic 15,5 36,0 
Estonia 10,0 35,6 
Latvia 9,0 30,7 
Lithuania 10,4 31,0 
Poland 10,4 36,7 
Slovakia 11,7 32,2 
Hungary 13,4 39,7 
Comment: In departure from the other figures on tax revenue, the 
figures come from the AMECO database because this includes data 
on the new EU Member States. This may cause slight differences 
compared to the other data presented. 
Table B.4: Tax revenue by tax types as percentage of total tax revenue, EU15 and 
Hungary, 2001 
% indirect direct ssc 
Belgium 29,6 39,2 31,2 
Denmark 30,3 27,3 42,5 
Germany 35,1 60,4 4,4 
Greece 33,8 30,5 35,7 
Spain 40,8 28,3 30,9 
France 34,7 29,1 36,3 
Ireland 43,6 41,9 14,5 
Italy 35,3 35,7 29 
Luxemburg 34,1 38,2 27,7 
Netherlands 33,7 30,6 35,6 
Austria 33,8 33,4 32,8 
Portugal 41,4 27,8 30,9 
Finland 29,9 43 27,1 
Sweden 31,3 41,2 27,5 
United Kingdom 37,8 45,2 17,1 
EU15 33,7 34,9 31,4 
Euro12 31,1 29,5 33,9 
Hungary 39,3 27,8 33,0 
 
Table B.5: Tax revenue by tax types as percentage of total tax revenue, 7 new EU 
Member States and Hungary, 2003 
 indirect direct ssc 
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Czech Republic 31,6 26,8 41,6 
Slovakia 34,6 22,1 43,3 
Estonia 37,3 28,1 34,6 
Hungary 38,8 26,5 34,7 
Latvia 40,3 28,2 31,5 
Poland 41,0 18,9 40,1 
Lithuania 41,8 29,9 28,3 
 
Comment: In departure from the other figures on tax revenue, the 
figures come from the AMECO database. This may cause slight 
differences compared to the other data presented. 
Table B6: Indirect tax revenues by major tax types as percentage of GDP in 2001 
% VAT Excise tax Other indirect Sum 
VAT/total 
indirect 
Belgium 7 2,4 4,2 13,6 51,5 
Denmark 6,7 2,3 3,5 12,5 53,6 
Germany 9,7 4,2 3,6 17,5 55,4 
Greece 6,1 2,6 3,3 12 50,8 
Spain 8,2 3,4 3,4 15 54,7 
France 7,4 2,5 5,8 15,7 47,1 
Ireland 7 4,5 2,1 13,6 51,5 
Italy 6,4 2,5 6,1 15 42,7 
Luxemburg 6,2 4,3 3,8 14,3 43,4 
Netherlands 7,6 2,6 3,3 13,5 56,3 
Austria 8,1 2,8 4,5 15,4 52,6 
Portugal 8,3 3 3,6 14,9 55,7 
Finland 8,1 3,4 2,2 13,7 59,1 
Sweden 9 3,2 4,7 16,9 53,3 
United Kingdom 6,9 2,2 5,1 14,2 48,6 
EU15 7 2,5 4,5 14 50,0 
Euro12 6,9 2,5 4,4 13,8 50,0 
Hungary 8,3 3,6 3,5 15,4 53,7 
 
Table B.7: Indirect tax revenues as percentage of GDP  
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 13,3 13,7 13,9 13,9 14,1 14 13,6     13,8 
Denmark 17,2 17,5 17,7 18,5 18,3 17,4 17,5     17,7 
Germany 12,3 12,2 12,2 12,3 12,8 12,7 12,5     12,4 
Greece 14,4 14,8 14,9 15,1 15,6 15,9 15     15,1 
Spain 10,9 10,9 11,2 11,8 12,3 12,3 12     11,6 
France 16,2 16,8 16,7 16,6 16,5 16,1 15,7     16,4 
Ireland 14,7 14,6 14,2 14 13,8 13,9 13,6     14,1 
Italy 12,7 12,5 12,9 15,9 15,6 15,5 15     14,3 
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Luxemburg 13,5 13,4 13,6 13,5 14,4 14,8 14,3     13,9 
Netherlands 11,9 12,2 12,5 12,5 13,1 13 13,5     12,7 
Austria 15,2 15,4 15,8 15,6 15,8 15,3 15,4     15,5 
Portugal 14,6 14,7 14,5 15 15,4 15,1 14,9     14,9 
Finland 14,1 14,2 14,9 14,6 14,8 14,1 13,7     14,3 
Sweden 16,3 16,8 17,1 17,8 19 16,9 16,9     17,3 
United Kingdom 14,1 14 14,2 14,1 14,4 14,5 14,2     14,2 
EU15 13,6 13,7 13,8 14,3 14,5 14,3 14     14 
Euro12 13,4 13,4 13,6 14,1 14,3 14,1 13,8     13,8 
Hungary     16,4 16,2 15,4 15,0 16,7 16,0 
 
Table B8: Indirect tax revenues as percentage of total tax revenue 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 29,5 30,2 30,3 29,9 30,6 30,5 29,6   30,1 
Denmark 34,8 35 35,6 36,8 35,6 35,1 35,1   35,5 
Germany 29,8 29 29 29,1 29,9 29,6 30,3   29,5 
Greece 44,1 44,8 43,6 41,4 42,1 41,2 40,8   42,6 
Spain 32,6 32,4 32,7 34,2 35,1 34,6 33,8   33,6 
France 36,8 37,2 37 36,9 36,2 35,5 34,7   36,3 
Ireland 43,9 43,6 43,4 43,5 43,1 42,9 43,6   43,4 
Italy 30,9 29,1 28,9 36,7 36,1 36,3 35,3   33,3 
Luxemburg 31,9 31,6 32,7 33,6 35,3 35,9 34,1   33,6 
Netherlands 29,3 29,9 30,7 31,1 31,5 31,4 33,7   31,1 
Austria 35,8 35,2 35,4 35,1 35,5 35,2 33,8   35,2 
Portugal 43,5 42,7 41,8 43 42,9 41,4 41,4   42,4 
Finland 30,5 29,9 31,8 31,3 31,4 29,4 29,9   30,6 
Sweden 33,3 32,4 32,8 33,2 35,9 32,1 31,3   33 
United Kingdom 39,9 40,1 39,9 38,3 39,1 38,5 37,8   39,1 
EU15 32,4 31,7 32,1 33,6 34,1 33,8 33,7   33,1 
Euro12 29,2 28,5 28,7 30,8 31,1 30,9 31,1   30,1 
Hungary     41,2 41,1 39,3 38,6 41,7 40,4 
 
Table B9: Direct tax revenues by major tax types as proportion of GDP in 2001 
 PIT Corporate Other Sum PIT/direct 
Belgium 13,7 3,3 1,1 18,1 75,7 
Denmark 10,1 0,6 0,5 11,2 90,2 
Germany 26,3 3,1 0,7 30,1 87,4 
Greece 7,1 3 0,7 10,8 65,7 
Spain 4,8 3,2 2,4 10,4 46,2 
France 8,5 3,1 1,6 13,2 64,4 
Ireland 8,3 3,6 1,2 13,1 63,4 
Italy 11,2 2,9 1,1 15,2 73,7 
Luxemburg 7,3 7,7 1 16 45,6 
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Netherlands 6,5 4,1 1,6 12,2 53,3 
Austria 10,9 3,3 1 15,2 71,7 
Portugal 6 3,6 0,4 10 60,0 
Finland 14,5 4,3 1 19,8 73,2 
Sweden 17,6 3,7 1 22,3 78,9 
United Kingdom 11 3,3 2,7 17 64,7 
EU15 10,1 2,6 1,4 14,1 71,6 
Euro12 9,4 2,4 1 12,8 73,4 
Hungary 7,7 2,4 0,9 10,9 70,4 
 
Table B10: Direct tax revenues as percentage of GDP 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 17,1 17 17,4 18,1 17,5 17,8 18,1   17,6 
Denmark 30,6 30,8 30,5 30,1 31 29,8 30,1   30,4 
Germany 11,2 11,6 11,3 11,6 12,1 12,6 11,2   11,7 
Greece 7,8 7,4 8,2 9,8 10,2 11,2 10,4   9,3 
Spain 10,5 10,6 10,8 10,5 10,6 10,9 10,8   10,7 
France 9 9,4 10,1 12,2 12,7 12,9 13,2   11,4 
Ireland 13,7 14,2 14,2 13,9 13,9 14,1 13,1   13,9 
Italy 15,4 15,7 16,9 14,9 15,3 14,8 15,2   15,5 
Luxemburg 17,6 18 17,5 16,5 16 15,9 16   16,8 
Netherlands 12,7 13,2 12,7 12,5 12,5 12,4 12,2   12,6 
Austria 12 13,2 13,5 13,7 13,4 13,3 15,2   13,5 
Portugal 8,9 9,6 9,7 9,4 9,9 10,5 10   9,7 
Finland 17,6 19,2 18,7 19,1 19,1 21,7 19,8   19,3 
Sweden 19,7 20,9 21 21,8 21,3 21,4 22,3   21,2 
United Kingdom 15,1 14,9 15,2 16,4 16,4 16,8 17   16 
EU15 12,8 13,2 13,5 13,8 14,1 14,3 14,1   13,7 
Euro12 11,7 12,2 12,5 12,7 13 13,2 12,8   12,6 
Hungary     10,0 10,3 10,9 10,9 10,5 10,5 
 
Table B11: Direct tax revenues as percentage of total tax revenue 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 37,8 37,6 38,1 38,9 38,1 38,7 39,2   38,4 
Denmark 62,1 61,8 61,3 60,1 60,2 60,2 60,4   60,9 
Germany 27,2 27,5 26,9 27,7 28,3 29,4 27,3   27,8 
Greece 23,8 22,5 23,9 27 27,4 29,1 28,3   26 
Spain 31,3 31,4 31,6 30,6 30,2 30,5 30,5   30,9 
France 20,5 20,9 22,3 27 27,8 28,4 29,1   25,1 
Ireland 41,1 42,5 43,3 43,4 43,5 43,5 41,9   42,8 
Italy 37,4 36,7 37,7 34,5 35,3 34,7 35,7   36 
Luxemburg 41,6 42,5 42,1 41 39,2 38,5 38,2   40,4 
Netherlands 31,2 32,3 31,3 30,9 30 30 30,6   30,9 
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Austria 28,4 30 30,3 30,8 30,3 30,6 33,4   30,5 
Portugal 26,6 27,8 27,9 27 27,5 28,8 27,8   27,6 
Finland 38 40,6 40 41,1 40,7 45,2 43   41,2 
Sweden 40 40,4 40,4 40,7 40,2 40,7 41,2   40,5 
United Kingdom 42,6 42,6 42,6 44,5 44,3 44,6 45,2   43,8 
EU15 33,2 33,7 34,1 34,2 34,4 35,1 34,9   34,2 
Euro12 29 29,6 29,7 29,1 29,5 30 29,5   29,5 
Hungary     25,1 26,2 27,8 28,2 26,2 26,7 
 
Table B12: Distribution of revenue from social security contributions in proportion of GDP, 
2001 
 Employer Employee Self-employed Sum 
Belgium 8,6 4,5 1,2 14,3 
Denmark 7,5 6,9 3,1 17,5 
Germany 0,3 1,9 0 2,2 
Greece 8,9 2 1,8 12,7 
Spain 5,3 4,4 1,6 11,3 
France 11,3 4,1 1,1 16,5 
Ireland 2,8 1,5 0,2 4,5 
Italy 8,6 2,4 1,4 12,4 
Luxemburg 5,2 5,1 1,3 11,6 
Netherlands 4,6 6,8 2,9 14,3 
Austria 7 6,2 1,7 14,9 
Portugal 7,1 3,4 0,5 11 
Finland 9,2 2,3 0,9 12,4 
Sweden 11,6 3 0,3 14,9 
United Kingdom 3,6 2,6 0,2 6,4 
EU15 7,4 4,1 1,5 13 
Euro12 8,3 4,6 1,9 14,8 
Hungary 10,3 2,2 0,5 13,0 
 
Table B13: Revenue from social security contributions as proportion of total tax revenue 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 32,7 32,2 31,6 31,2 31,2 30,8 31,2   31,6 
Denmark 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 4,2 4,6 4,4   3,7 
Germany 43 43,5 44,1 43,2 41,8 41 42,5   42,7 
Greece 32,1 32,8 32,5 31,6 30,6 29,7 30,9   31,5 
Spain 36 36,2 35,6 35,2 34,8 34,9 35,7   35,5 
France 42,6 41,9 40,7 36,1 36 36,1 36,3   38,5 
Ireland 15 13,9 13,3 13,1 13,4 13,5 14,5   13,8 
Italy 31,6 34,2 33,4 28,8 28,7 28,9 29   30,7 
Luxemburg 26,5 25,9 25,2 25,4 25,5 25,6 27,7   26 
Netherlands 39,5 37,9 38 38 38,5 38,6 35,6   38 
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Austria 35,8 34,8 34,3 34,1 34,2 34,2 32,8   34,3 
Portugal 30 29,5 30,3 30 29,5 29,9 30,9   30 
Finland 31,5 29,5 28,2 27,6 27,8 25,4 27,1   28,2 
Sweden 26,7 27,3 26,8 26,1 23,9 27,2 27,5   26,5 
United Kingdom 17,4 17,4 17,5 17,2 16,5 16,9 17,1   17,1 
EU15 34,4 34,6 33,8 32,2 31,5 31,1 31,4   32,7 
Euro12 36,1 36,5 36,3 34,6 34 33,6 33,9   35 
Hungary     33,64 32,70 32,99 33,20 32,12 32,93 
 
Table B14: Tax revenue by level of government as a percentage of total tax revenue, 2001 
% Central gov. state Local gov. ss funds EU institutions 
Belgium 34,6 24,2 4,6 34,5 2,1 
Denmark 27,7 21,7 6,8 42,5 1,4 
Germany 61,4 0 33,8 4,4 0,4 
Greece 46,4 7,6 8,8 35,4 1,8 
Spain 66,8 0 1 30,5 1,8 
France 41,7 0 9,4 47,5 1,3 
Ireland 84,1 0 2,1 11,9 2,1 
Italy 54,9 0 14,9 28,9 1,3 
Luxemburg 66,2 0 5,6 26,8 1,3 
Netherlands 58,6 0 3,6 35,6 2,1 
Austria 53 7,4 11,5 26,5 1,6 
Portugal 61,5 0 6 30,8 1,7 
Finland 51,7 0 22,1 25 1,1 
Sweden 58,5 0 29,3 11,1 1,1 
United Kingdom 94,4 0 4,1 0 1,5 
EU15 54,3 8,3 9 26,9 1,5 
Euro12 54,8 4,4 11,4 28,0 1,5 
Hungary 59,3 0,0 10,4 30,3 0,0 
 
Table B15: Tax revenue due to local governments as percentage of total tax revenue 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 4,9 5 5 4,7 4,8 4,2 4,6   4,7 
Denmark 31,4 31,1 31,3 31,8 31,3 32,7 33,8   31,9 
Germany 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,9 7 7 6,8   6,7 
Greece 0,9 1 1 0,9 0,9 0,9 1   0,9 
Spain 8,7 8,5 8,8 9,2 9,2 9 8,8   8,9 
France 10,4 10,6 10,4 10,4 10,2 9,6 9,4   10,1 
Ireland 2,6 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,1 2 2,1   2,3 
Italy 7,8 8,2 7,9 13,3 12,4 13,9 14,9   11,2 
Luxemburg 6,4 6,5 6,1 6,1 5,7 5,8 5,6   6 
Netherlands 3,2 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,4 3,4 3,6   3,4 
Austria 12 12,1 11,9 11,7 11,7 11,6 11,5   11,8 
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Portugal 5,2 5,2 5,2 5,6 6 6 6   5,6 
Finland 22,2 22,7 21,6 21,7 21,6 21,6 22,1   21,9 
Sweden 30,2 30,5 29,8 28,3 28,7 29,3 29,3   29,4 
United Kingdom 3,7 3,8 3,8 3,8 3,9 3,9 4,1   3,8 
EU15 7,7 8 7,8 8,8 8,7 8,9 9   8,4 
Euro12 6,9 7,1 7,1 8,6 8,4 8,7 8,9   7,9 
Hungary     9,5 9,8 10,4 10,6 11,2 10,3 
 
Table B16: Tax revenues on capital, labour and consumption as percentage of total tax 
revenues, in 2001 
% labour consumption capital 
Belgium 54,8 24 21,2 
Denmark 59,6 25,9 14,6 
Germany 55,7 31,6 12,7 
Greece 46,5 28 25,5 
Spain 35,4 41,9 22,7 
France 51 26,7 22,2 
Ireland 36,3 38,5 25,2 
Italy 48,3 24,4 27,4 
Luxemburg 39,7 26,8 33,6 
Netherlands 47,2 30,5 22,4 
Austria 53,2 27,1 19,7 
Portugal 42 33,9 24,1 
Finland 53 29,2 17,8 
Sweden 61,1 23,7 15,2 
United Kingdom 39,1 35,5 25,4 
EU15 50,4 28,3 21,4 
Euro12 49,5 37,7 12,8 
 
Table B17: Tax revenues on capital as percentage of total tax revenue 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 20,2 20,5 20,8 21,9 21,4 21,4 21,2   21,1 
Denmark 11,6 11,7 12,2 13,2 14,2 12,3 12,7   12,5 
Germany 14 15,6 15,4 16,1 17 17,3 14,6   15,7 
Greece 20,6 19,6 22,4 23,9 25,5 27,2 22,7   23,1 
Spain 23,2 23,1 24,7 24,5 25,6 25,9 25,5   24,6 
France 18,7 19,2 20,1 20,7 21,2 21,9 22,2   20,6 
Ireland 20 21,5 22,3 23,4 25,3 25,4 25,2   23,3 
Italy 29,4 29,1 29,5 26,7 26,9 26,8 27,4   27,9 
Luxemburg 33,3 34,2 34,2 35,2 33,9 34,4 33,6   34,1 
Netherlands 18,5 20,7 21,8 21,9 22,1 21,8 22,4   21,3 
Austria 15,8 16,3 16,2 16,9 15,9 16,5 19,7   16,8 
Portugal 20,8 21,9 23 23,2 24,9 25,1 24,1   23,3 
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Finland 13 13,8 15,6 17,3 17,6 21,1 17,8   16,6 
Sweden 8,9 12,4 12,4 12,6 13,3 14,5 15,2   12,7 
United Kingdom 21,9 23 24,6 25,4 25,1 25,4 25,4   24,4 
EU15 19 20,3 21,1 21,1 21,5 21,9 21,4   20,9 
Euro12 17,9 19,2 19,7 19,4 20 20,3 19,5   19,4 
Hungary     11,7 11,3 12,8 13,0 12,8 12,3 
 
Table B18: Tax revenues on labour income as percentage of total tax revenues 
% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 average 
Belgium 55,6 54,6 54,5 53,9 53,6 53,8 54,8   54,4 
Denmark 56,8 56,3 55,7 54 53,9 55,7 55,7   55,4 
Germany 60,3 59,7 60,3 59,5 58 57,8 59,6   59,3 
Greece 36,2 37,2 37,4 37,2 36,2 34,6 35,4   36,3 
Spain 50 50,1 48,2 47,2 45,2 45,3 46,5   47,5 
France 52,2 51,5 51,3 50,8 50,7 51 51   51,2 
Ireland 40,8 39,6 39 37,8 36,7 36,5 36,3   38,1 
Italy 45,1 47,2 47,3 48,5 47,7 47,4 48,3   47,4 
Luxemburg 39,7 39,3 38,7 37,5 38 38,1 39,7   38,7 
Netherlands 54,5 51,8 50,3 49,8 49,7 49,9 47,2   50,4 
Austria 56,9 54,8 55,3 54,9 55,5 55,1 53,2   55,1 
Portugal 41,8 41,3 41,3 40,7 40 40,8 42   41,1 
Finland 57,3 57,1 53,5 52,4 51,8 50,3 53   53,6 
Sweden 63,4 62 62,2 62,6 61,8 61,2 61,1   62,1 
United Kingdom 40,1 38,9 37,6 38,3 37,9 38,7 39,1   38,7 
EU15 52,9 52,3 51,3 51,1 50,1 49,8 50,4   51,1 
Euro12 51,5 51,2 50,8 50,5 49,5 49,2 49,9   50,4 
Hungary     48,8 48,9 49,5 50,0 47,3 48,9 
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C. Summary tables of general government 
Table C.1: General government as percentage of GDP in a functional breakdown, 
EU-15 (2001) and Hungary (2000-2002) 
 State operation functions Welfare functions 
 
Gener
al 
public 
service
s. 
Defe
nce 
Public 
order 
and 
safety 
Econo
mic 
functi
ons 
Enviro
nment 
protect
ion 
Hou
sing 
and  
Healt
h care 
Recre
ation, 
cultur
e and 
religi
on 
Educa
tion 
Social 
prote
ction 
Inter
est 
paym
ents 
Total 
Belgium 3,4 1,2 1,6 4,4 0,7 0,4 6,6 1,0 6,2 17,4 6,5 49,4 
Denmark 0,6 1,7 1,0 3,6 n.a. 0,9 5,4 1,7 8,3 24,2 3,9 55,3 
Germany 3,0 1,2 1,6 4,3 0,6 1,1 6,3 0,7 4,2 21,9 3,3 48,3 
Greece 9,9 3,2 0,8 5,5 0,5 0,4 4,1 0,4 3,8 18,8 6,3 48,1 
Spain 2,5 1,2 2,1 4,4 0,9 1,1 5,4 1,1 4,3 13,5 3,1 39,3 
France 3,5 2,4 1,0 5,2 1,3 1,0 7,9 0,8 6,0 20,4 3,1 52,5 
Ireland 2,0 0,7 1,5 5,0 n.a. 1,8 6,3 0,6 4,3 9,7 1,5 34,1 
Italy 3,1 1,1 1,9 4,0 0,8 0,9 6,3 0,9 5,1 17,7 6,4 48,5 
Luxembourg 4,9 0,3 1,0 2,8 1,3 0,8 4,9 1,7 4,7 17,1 0,3 39,1 
Netherlands 4,6 1,6 1,5 5,6 0,7 1,5 4,1 1,1 4,8 17,5 3,5 46,4 
Austria 5,0 0,9 1,4 5,5 0,4 1,0 5,8 1,0 5,8 21,9 3,6 52,1 
Portugal 3,5 1,7 1,9 6,1 0,7 0,9 6,8 1,2 6,9 13,4 3,1 46,4 
Finland 3,7 1,5 1,4 4,6 0,3 0,6 6,0 1,2 6,3 20,6 2,7 49,0 
Sweden 5,2 2,2 1,4 4,4 0,3 1,0 6,6 1,1 7,7 23,9 3,3 57,2 
Great Britain 1,9 2,6 1,9 2,3 0,5 0,4 6,1 0,5 4,6 16,0 2,4 40,2 
EU-15 3,2 1,7 1,6 4,2 0,7 0,9 6,3 0,8 5,1 18,8 3,6 47,1 
EURO-12 3,6 1,5 1,5 4,7 0,8 1,0 6,4 0,9 5,0 19,2 3,9 48,1 
Hungary             
2000 5,3 1,2 2,0 5,9 0,8 1,5 4,6 1,4 5,7 14,7 5,6 47,9 
2001 5,5 1,3 2,1 6,1 1,0 1,4 4,6 1,5 5,9 14,7 4,8 48,1 
2002 5,0 1,4 2,2 10,3 1,0 1,7 4,8 1,7 6,2 15,5 4,0 53,3 
Source: International data: Eurostat, Hungarian data: MoF Calculations of the Budget 
Department.  
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Table C.2: Structure of current expenditure as percentage of GDP in  
European Union Member States in 2002 
 
Public 
consumpti
on 
Social 
transfers 
in kind 
Social 
transfers 
other than 
in kind 
Interest 
payments Subsidies 
Other 
current 
expenditu
re 
Belgium 8,3 14,1 16,1 6,1 1,6 2,1 
Denmark 7,6 18,8 17,5 2,9 2,2 2,6 
Germany 7,9 11,2 19,4 3,1 1,5 1,7 
Greece 9,4 6,2 16,4 6,2 0,2 1,3 
Spain 7,7 10,2 12,3 2,9 1,1 1,3 
France 9,4 14,5 18,1 3,2 1,3 1,8 
Ireland 5,5 9,6 8,4 1,4 0,8 2,2 
Italy 7,2 11,8 17,0 5,9 1,1 1,5 
Luxembourg 7,4 10,5 15,7 0,3 1,7 3,2 
Netherlands 11,4 13,1 11,8 3,1 1,5 1,8 
Austria 7,1 11,6 18,6 3,6 2,8 3,4 
Portugal 8,5 12,6 12,9 3,0 1,5 2,3 
Finland 7,6 14,0 16,8 2,2 1,4 2,6 
Sweden 8,5 19,5 18,4 3,2 1,5 3,8 
Great Britain 7,7 12,4 13,5 2,0 0,6 2,6 
Source: Eurostat.  
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